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DEATH AND CONSENSUS LIBERALISM 
Jeremy Williams 
University of Birmingham 
 
1. Introduction 
Theories of public reason propose moral constraints on political action. They have, then, 
an inherently practical focus. Each such theory articulates a test or standard of public 
justification which is purported to show, roughly speaking, when political institutions, laws, 
or policies have been legitimately established, and when they ought to be abolished, 
repealed, or reformed. Depending on the details of the test which a given theory proposes, 
the upheavals it requires to political practice could be extremely radical – and not 
necessarily welcome. The full evaluation of any theory of public reason must therefore 
depend on whether the results of applying it are sufficiently plausible or palatable. Rawls 
acknowledged this point explicitly. After developing his seminal idea and ideal of public 
reason in Political Liberalism, he concluded that ‘whether this or some other understanding 
of public reason is acceptable can be decided only by examining the answers it leads to 
over a wide range of the more likely cases.’ 1 
Despite Rawls’s counsel, however, philosophical investigation into the 
implications of public reasoning for concrete political questions remains surprisingly rare. 
Most discussion of public reason is pitched at a fairly high level of abstraction, consisting 
of reflection on whether, in general outline, particular accounts are coherent or compelling, 
and analysis of the best ways to specify their various theoretical components (such as the 
conception of a reasonable person, or a justificatory reason). To the extent that proponents 
																																																						
1 Rawls 2005: 254. 
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of public reason consider in depth what their theories portend for the resolution of 
particular policy problems, their approach tends to be to handpick issues as illustrative case 
studies, on which their theory is taken to provide clear, attractive guidance. In this paper, 
my aim is to contribute to remedying this general omission of the literature. I do so by 
drawing out some hitherto unexplored practical implications of public reason under the 
Rawlsian conception, which remains, in spite of fierce competition, the dominant brand 
of public reason liberalism on the market. 
The Rawlsian conception provides the archetype of the so-called consensus model 
of public reason. Consensus theories are distinguished by their restriction of the reasons 
that may be invoked in justifying exercises of political power to those that can be 
recognised as in some sense good or acceptable grounds for political action by all qualified 
members of the community. On the Rawlsian version of the consensus model, political 
decisions must be justified, more specifically, with reference to the moral reasons given by 
only the limited set of political values and concepts that all citizens will share if they are 
(by Rawlsian lights) reasonable. This is not to say that the Rawlsian view altogether 
disallows appeal to controversial reasons. For it permits justification on the basis of 
competing views about the interpretation, applicability, and relative importance of citizens’ 
shared values, as adduced from within their reasonable ‘political conceptions of justice’.2 
The theory does, however, significantly constrain political disagreement, by specifying that 
reasons drawn from reasonable citizens’ religions, metaphysics, conceptions of the good, 
and other aspects of their ‘comprehensive doctrines’, cannot count as justificatory. And it 
imposes upon all individuals who share in the exercise of the state’s coercive power, 
																																																						
2 A political conception of justice is, roughly, one that takes account of only those moral values that constitute 
shared political values, and that tries to specify and order these in a sufficiently precise way to provide 
determinate answers to political questions. See Rawls 2005 at, e.g., 386. 
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including ordinary voters, a moral ‘duty of civility’ to advocate and lend support to only 
political initiatives that are publicly justified according to the foregoing standards.3 
Any proposal that important decisions be taken on the basis of an artificially 
restricted set of reasons is likely to invite concern that the ability of political agents to 
reason and choose well will be unduly inhibited. Accordingly, one crucial test for Rawlsian 
public reason is whether it is, as Rawls himself puts it, complete. Rawls defined completeness 
as a matter of whether the content of public reason - that is, the total set of ideas, 
arguments and principles from which public justifications are to be composed – is 
sufficient to generate ‘a reasonable answer to all, or nearly all’ the political questions for 
which the use of public reason is required.4 He hypothesised that his conception of public 
																																																						
3 See Rawls 2005 at e.g. 217ff. On the so-called ‘wide view’ of public reason, which Rawls came to endorse 
in his final works on the subject, the duty of civility is somewhat relaxed: citizens are permitted to invoke 
their comprehensive doctrines in public argument, subject to the ‘proviso’ that a case in public reason can 
be produced ‘in due course’ that leads to the same conclusion they seek to defend (Rawls 2005: 462). The 
wide view is somewhat controversial among Rawlsians (for a rejection of it, see Hartley and Watson 2009). 
But because it does not give decision-makers any latitude to depart from the policy prescriptions that would 
be issued by public reason alone, it will make no difference to the argument of this paper whether or not it 
is assumed to be in force. 
4 See Rawls 2005 at, e.g., 244ff or 454. Rawls further advises (at 246) that whether an answer counts as 
reasonable for purposes of evaluating the completeness of public reason is to be ‘judged by public reason 
alone’. In other words, public reason is not to be understood as incomplete just because it generates answers 
to which we object from our comprehensive or all-things-considered moral outlook. Rather, completeness 
is undermined only by cases in which the public reasons available for addressing a political question are so 
sparse that either no answer can be reached, or we can produce only answers that are disqualified as 
incompatible with relevant political values or principles of public reason itself. Interestingly, meanwhile, in 
The Law of Peoples, one of Rawls’s comments might be taken to suggest, differently, that a model of public 
reason should be accounted incomplete not merely in the event that it fails to orient political decision-
making, but also in the event that we cannot reconcile ourselves to its guidance in reflective equilibrium. For 
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reason is indeed complete in this sense, though he did not attempt to show it, and his 
defenders have not, I believe, met that challenge either.5 The reasons for this are perhaps 
understandable. Demonstrating that a conception of public reason is complete seems a 
highly daunting - if not Sisyphean - task, involving delving into the minutiae of a vast 
number of political problems, to establish, in each case, what answers can be justified by 
public reasons alone. Showing that a conception of public reason is incomplete, on the 
other hand, may be a more manageable undertaking. If a sufficient number of examples 
can be found in which public reason proves inimical to forming at least one reasonable 
conclusion then the charge of incompleteness is substantiated, without the need to 
exhaustively catalogue the outcomes of public reasoning for other questions. Yet, while 
doubts about the incompleteness of Rawlsian public reason have been often voiced, critics 
have thus far carried out relatively little of the necessary philosophical spadework.6 The 
																																																						
discussion, see Williams 2016: 3-4. At certain points below I will have occasion to discuss the possibility of 
public reasoning’s leading us to policy conclusions that are defective in the latter sense. But to forestall 
confusion, I shall throughout use the term ‘completeness’ in only the first sense given above (the sense also 
standardly attributed to it in the secondary literature), on which it concerns, narrowly, whether public reason 
enables deliberators to argue their way to any resolution to the political problems put before them at all. 
5 To be sure, there exist defences of the completeness of Rawlsian public reason. But their general strategy 
is to argue (a) that the (hitherto unmet) burden of proof lies with those who dispute public reason’s 
completeness to make their case, and (b) that insofar as public reason fails to provide a basis for decision-
making, there are nonetheless ways for citizens to select between the policy options before them that do not 
involve resorting to non-public reasoning. See especially Williams 2000, and Schwartzman 2004. I examine 
claim (b) in section 8, below. 
6 The most detailed attempt in the earlier literature to advance the incompleteness objection through 
sustained analysis of particular political controversies appears in Greenawalt 1988, ch.s 6-8. Greenawalt’s 
principal examples of alleged incompleteness are the problems of abortion and animal welfare. His argument 
predates Political Liberalism, and thus does not respond to the mature version of Rawlsian public reason, as 
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question of the completeness of Rawlsian public reason therefore remains crucially 
unsettled. 
In speculating about the political issues that would be most likely to make revealing 
test cases for the incompleteness objection, commentators have typically alighted on the 
field of bioethics. For it contains many questions that appear to turn on precisely the sort of 
deep, longstanding philosophical debates that public reason requires citizens to put to one 
side. The question most commonly identified in the literature as raising the spectre of 
incompleteness is that of abortion. Having considered the implications of Rawlsian public 
reason for that controversy elsewhere,7 however, in this paper I address an important – 
and thus far widely overlooked - bioethical problem that arises at the other end of human 
life. This is the problem of how to define and diagnose the death of a person, or determine 
at what point the clinical and legal practices conventionally associated with death, such as 
the removal of vital organs, may take place. My thesis will be that this is a matter on which 
public reason does indeed have a grave incompleteness problem. Public reason is 
indeterminate, I aim to demonstrate, between a broad range of legal definitions of death 
(at least bracketing the socially contingent effects which candidate policies might have on 
third parties).8 I also aim to go beyond existing articulations of the incompleteness 
																																																						
developed there and in subsequent essays (though for a new argument to comparable effect, also focusing 
on abortion, and published only after the present article was completed, see Kramer 2017: ch. 3. I comment 
on Kramer’s argument further in fn.s 47 and 76, below.) I have argued previously, moreover, that in the case 
of the problems Greenawalt cites, the charge to which Rawlsian public reason is vulnerable is not 
incompleteness but something else. See Williams 2015. Especially if I was right, the incompleteness objection 
still stands in need of substantiation, of the kind I aim to provide here. 
7 In Williams 2015. 
8 Note that ‘indeterminate’ is a term of art within the public reason literature, on the precise meaning of 
which see the text around fn. 26, below. 
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objection, moreover, by examining what the Rawlsian view implies about how decision-
makers ought to respond to indeterminacies in public reason. Insofar as the route to a 
reasoned choice between competing criteria of death is indeed foreclosed, I shall contend, 
public reason requires that selection among policy options proceed in an unacceptably 
arbitrary fashion. 
Before I begin, three clarifications about the scope of my argument and 
conclusions. First, to reiterate, my target is the Rawlsian view (and hence, in what follows, 
the terms ‘public reason’ and ‘consensus liberalism’ always refer to the Rawlsian versions 
thereof, unless otherwise specified). But who, for present purposes, counts as a Rawlsian? 
I take my critique to apply to consensus theorists who believe that public justification must 
proceed on the basis of the reasons given by political values and concepts shared by 
reasonable citizens, and who follow Rawls in identifying who the reasonable are. As I 
understand their respective positions, Jonathan Quong and Andrew Lister both fall into 
this category, for instance, despite their various innovations on Rawls’s original theory.9 
Second, the case I make here against the Rawlsian view, thus defined, is admittedly 
pro tanto. I believe that the results of applying the model to the problem of death are 
sufficiently unwelcome that one would be warranted in abandoning it on the basis of my 
argument here alone. But I shall not attempt to convince the committed Rawlsian who 
believes that the difficulties identified do not outweigh the various merits of their theory. 
This is, then, a contribution to a wider critique of consensus liberalism’s consequences for 
political practice. I reflect further on the implications of my findings for the future of 
consensus liberalism in the paper’s conclusion. 
Third and finally, the argument of this paper, if sound, might be taken to provide 
indirect support not only to the various strands of comprehensive or ethical liberalism 
																																																						
9 See Quong 2011 and Lister 2013. 
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(which is where, for what it’s worth, my own loyalties lie), but also to consensus liberalism’s 
emerging competitor within the public reason fold: the innovative recent convergence liberal 
view.10 On convergence liberalism, few restrictions are imposed on the reasons by 
reference to which citizens may evaluate the case for political action (beyond, principally, 
the requirement that those reasons be intelligible). But the view holds, demandingly, that a 
law or policy is only publicly justified, and permissibly imposed, if there are from each 
reasonable perspective sufficient grounds to endorse it, or not veto it.11 Whether 
convergence liberalism does indeed derive comparative advantage from my argument will 
depend, I think, on whether it too runs afoul of objections that target its problematic 
implications in practice. I suspect that it does. But this is a matter for another day. 
 
2. Determining death: the political problem 
It will help to preface my argument with some background regarding how the 
conceptualisation and clinical determination of death arose as a matter of political 
concern.12 Prior to around the mid-twentieth century, the limitations of medical science 
were such that the irreversible loss of heart and lung function was inevitably swiftly 
followed by complete loss of neurological functioning, and vice versa. Thus, there was no 
apparent reason for dissatisfaction with the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion of death, 
under which, if the patient’s heartbeat and breathing ceased and could not be restarted, 
(s)he was declared dead. The advent of modern respirators and other medical technologies 
from the 1950s onwards, however, made it possible to indefinitely sustain the 
																																																						
10 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I acknowledge this possibility. 
11 The chief architects of the convergence view are, of course, Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier. See especially 
Gaus 2011 and Vallier 2014. 
12 For a longer, informative account, see DeGrazia 2005: 115-24. 
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cardiopulmonary functioning of patients whose heart and lungs did not work 
independently, even in the face of permanent loss of consciousness, or brain activity 
generally. The practice of continuing treatment to patients under such conditions seemed, 
in the eyes of many observers, to involve an objectionable squandering of scarce resources 
and facilities, including not only medicines, hospital beds and machinery, but organs which, 
given new transplantation techniques, could provide others with immense benefits – 
especially if taken from a heart-beating donor. Debate thus ensued, within and beyond the 
medical community, over whether the medico-legal understanding of death might be 
amended, so as to facilitate more timely organ procurement, withdrawal of life support, 
and so forth, while protecting physicians from accusations of misconduct, or indeed 
murder. 
The result of that debate was a widespread legal shift around the world from the 
1960s, away from exclusive reliance on the cardiopulmonary criterion, and towards 
recognition of the idea of brain death. Brain death is standardly defined as the irretrievable 
cessation of functioning of the brain as a whole, including both the ‘higher brain’, in which 
consciousness is generated, and the ‘lower brain’, or brainstem, which is responsible, inter 
alia, for controlling autonomic bodily functions and reflexes such as respiration, heartbeat, 
blood pressure, and vomiting. While a large number of states have enshrined brain death 
in law, however, it remains controversial. Opposition comes primarily from two sources: 
those who, for various moral, philosophical and religious reasons, support a return to the 
cardiopulmonary standard, and those who favour adoption of a more radical higher brain 
death criterion. On the latter, death occurs upon the permanent loss of function of those 
regions of the brain in which the capacity for consciousness is realised, even if, because 
the brainstem survives, the patient’s somatic functions continue spontaneously, without 
the need for medical assistance beyond basic intravenous hydration and nutrition. 
	 9 
The continued controversy over the correct understanding of death has resulted in 
legal clashes, on both sides of the Atlantic, in which – for instance - parents have resisted 
attempts to disconnect their brain-dead children from ventilators, or remove their bodies 
to the mortuary, on grounds of their (typically religious) conviction that they were still 
alive.13 The practical significance of the choice between criteria of death is not, moreover, 
confined to the medical sphere. For in addition to deciding when physicians ought to be 
permitted to remove life support or organs from their patients, and when a human body 
may be autopsied and disposed of, we also need to know, say, under what conditions the 
crime of murder or manslaughter has taken place, when individuals and corporations may 
be sued for wrongful death, when the posthumous confiscation or reallocation of a 
person’s property may take place, and when to change a surviving spouse’s marital status 
to widowed. 
These are political matters, for which the decisions reached will be backed up by the 
state’s coercive power. Indeed, most if not all are fundamental political matters, in the 
Rawlsian sense that they represent, or are inextricably bound up with, so-called 
‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘questions of basic justice’. The latter fact is significant, 
because it means that even if – as Rawls himself proposed – the use of public reason is 
mandatory only when fundamental matters are at stake, public reason will inevitably be 
called upon to resolve the problem of how death is to be legally construed.14 Our question 
is whether it has the resources to do so. 
 
																																																						
13 For a description of two recent such cases, see Brierley 2015. 
14 For Rawls’s view that the duty to employ public reason applies only when addressing fundamental political 
questions, see Rawls 2005 at, e.g., pp. 214-5. For the view that the duty applies in political justification 
generally, see, e.g., Quong 2011, ch. 9. 
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3. Death and personal identity 
We have immediate grounds to suspect that it does not. For what our death consists in, 
and the conditions under which it occurs, appears to be a metaphysical question. At first 
sight, the statement that someone has died seems equivalent to the statement that she has 
ceased to exist. For the dead are, as we say, no more. (Let us accept this claim for now; I 
return to it in section 5.) To know when someone ceases to exist, we need to know what 
is involved in her – and our - continuing to exist over time. And that in turn depends on our 
fundamental nature, or what kind of entities or substances we essentially are. The truth 
about our fundamental nature and persistence conditions is what theories of personal identity 
seek to establish. There is, however, no such theory that is or could stably remain non-
contentious among Rawlsian reasonable citizens.  
 For illustrative purposes, consider just three of the most prominent (secular) 
families of views about personal identity in contemporary metaphysics.15 First, on so-called 
biological or animalist accounts, each of us is essentially a human animal or organism, whose 
persistence over time consists in the continued functioning of the body as an integrated 
unit (or perhaps in its performing certain specified critical functions). Second, under mind 
essentialism, we are instead fundamentally minds, or beings with the capacity for 
consciousness, who are distinct from our bodies or organisms (albeit closely related to and 
dependent upon them), and whose existence over time consists in the continued 
functioning of those regions of the brain responsible for generating conscious mental 
states. Third, on psychological approaches, our essential nature is not that of a merely 
conscious subject but of a more complex psychological being, whose existence over time 
																																																						
15 The literature on personal identity – even as restricted to the three canvassed views – is too vast to survey 
here. For three of the most influential proponents of these particular approaches, however, see, respectively, 
Olson 1997, McMahan 2002: ch. 1, and Parfit 1987: part III. 
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requires a certain minimum degree of continuity in the contents of our mental lives, such 
as our memories, beliefs, intentions, and so forth. There are no obvious grounds for 
thinking that a reasonable citizen could not endorse any of these positions.16 For 
reasonableness on the consensus liberal understanding is, in a nutshell, a matter of 
subscribing to the set of core normative beliefs which Rawlsians take to constitute the 
foundational commitments of a democratic society. These are the belief that one’s fellow 
citizens are free and equal in their moral standing, that society should be organised as a fair 
scheme of cooperation among them, and – most controversially - that, owing to the 
existence of the so-called ‘burdens of judgement’, and consequent ‘fact of reasonable 
pluralism’, all should practice reciprocal restraint in public justification.17 Each of the 
foregoing metaphysical views seems fully compatible with these political commitments. 
And crucially, those views imply – or can be developed in ways that imply - strikingly 
different conclusions about the conditions under which we die. 
Animalism, for instance, has been variously interpreted as compatible with the idea 
of brain death, and as ruling it out, and requiring a return to the traditional 
cardiopulmonary criterion.18 What is at stake in this debate is whether, absent the survival 
of the brain, the residual somatic functioning of which a human organism on artificial life 
support can be capable is sufficient for it to be considered alive.19 Animalist proponents 
of brain death typically claim that an organism whose brain is destroyed cannot function 
as a sufficiently integrated unit to be deemed alive, or that it is incapable of functions that 
																																																						
16 I explore in the next section whether there are any other less obvious reasons why they could not do so, 
arising out of the minutiae of the political conception of the person which the reasonable must endorse. 
17 See Rawls 2005: 48-66. 
18 Or some variant thereof. For an ‘updated’ cardiopulmonary standard, see DeGrazia 2005: 147-9. 
19 For differing perspectives, see, e.g., DeGrazia 2005: 142-9, Bernat 2006, and President's Council on 
Bioethics 2008: ch. 4. 
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are conceptually basic to biological life. For opponents of neurological criteria, however, 
it is absurd to claim that an organism that remains capable - as some brain-dead patients 
are - of such complex, coordinated activities as growth, sexual maturation, fighting 
infection, or gestating a fetus, is dead. 
Although many animalists have thought that we can die by suffering complete 
brain failure, few if any would say that the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness 
alone is sufficient for death. Rather, on the standard animalist account, an individual whose 
higher brain is destroyed, but whose brainstem continues to mediate the autonomic 
functions of the body, remains alive, but enters a persistent vegetative state. Mind essentialists, 
by contrast, claim that such a person is dead, and hence endorse the higher brain criterion 
of death. On their view, the circumstances of one’s death might be such that one leaves 
behind an organism that continues to function in various ways, with or without mechanical 
assistance. But since we are not fundamentally organisms, they contend, but minds that 
exist in some form of association with our organisms, we should think of the nonconscious 
animal that persists after higher brain death merely as a person’s discarded vehicle, or living 
corpse.20 
Finally, consider the psychological approach. Some of its proponents have argued 
that, like mind essentialism, it supports the higher brain death criterion.21 But, as others 
have argued, some versions of this approach appear to yield a still more radical – if not 
rather unsettling – understanding of death, whereby one of us might cease to exist even 
prior to the permanent cessation of consciousness.22 This is possible because the 
psychological approach holds that we cease to exist when the level of psychological 
																																																						
20 See especially McMahan 2002: 423-55. 
21 See, most famously, Green & Wikler 1980. 
22 See, e.g., McMahan 2002: 43-55, and DeGrazia 2005: 127 et circa. 
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continuity required for diachronic personal identity has broken down, for which loss of 
consciousness, though sufficient, is not strictly necessary. The psychological account 
implies, for instance, that in a science fiction scenario in which our memories and other 
psychological features are completely erased by some machine, we cease to exist, even if a 
conscious subject persists throughout the process. And outside the realm of science 
fiction, some psychological theories might imply that certain forms of dementia, whether 
brought on abruptly by injury, or progressively by disease, involve sufficiently dramatic 
erosion of our psychological capacities and characteristics as to be incompatible with our 
survival. 
The precise implications of a psychological theory regarding when we cease to be 
depend upon its details. If a sufficiently weak degree of psychological connectedness is 
held to be enough for identity – or any degree at all - then the theory’s implications for the 
point at which we cease to exist may be indistinguishable in all real-world cases from those 
of mind essentialism. Many psychological theories, however, hold that the psychological 
connectedness required for identity over time is of a more demanding level, of which only 
a person – in the Lockean sense of a self-conscious, thinking being – is capable. These 
theories hold, by implication, that our fundamental nature is that of a person in the 
foregoing sense. Those who endorse this view might be thought to be constrained to 
accept that death for us occurs immediately upon the loss of the higher cognitive 
endowments that make us Lockean persons. Yet, this is not necessarily so. For such a 
psychological theorist might think that, if our cognitive capacities are diminished below 
the level required for Lockean personhood, and we correspondingly dip below the 
threshold of psychological connectedness needed for identity, we do not cease to exist all 
at once, but fade out of existence gradually, as the remaining vestiges of our mental lives 
are extinguished – a process that only terminates at or around the final cessation of 
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consciousness.23 Nonetheless, if a psychological account holds that our existence cannot 
be a matter of degree, and depends on a level of psychological continuity which only 
Lockean persons can possess, then it does indeed seem committed to the conclusion that 
there is a chance of our ceasing to exist in a way that leaves a subject of basic consciousness 
behind for a non-negligible period of time. And while critics typically maintain that it is an 
embarrassment to the psychological approach insofar as it thus committed, there still 
seems nothing unreasonable, given the understanding of reasonableness advanced above, 
in a proponent of the psychological account’s accepting or positively embracing this 
conclusion. 
The foregoing discussion, while based on only a small sample of relevant 
metaphysical theories, indicates the existence of a striking degree of reasonable 
disagreement over the conditions under which we die, stemming in turn from reasonable 
pluralism over our fundamental nature and persistence conditions. To be sure, the scope 
of this disagreement is not unlimited. For all agree in particular (or so I shall assume) that, 
if a person suffers irreversible failure of cardiopulmonary function, causing the 
disintegration of his brain and body, death has occurred.24 The question is whether we must 
await cardiopulmonary failure before pronouncing the patient dead, if some prior 
neurological standard has already been satisfied. For the state to require that we wait for 
the satisfaction of a later standard is for it to coercively restrain those who would perform 
the various death-related activities earlier, and who will in many cases think that delay is 
not merely a mark of suboptimal public policy, but a threefold betrayal: of the family, 
whose grief is pointlessly prolonged; of those in desperate need of the patient’s organs or 
other resources; and of the memory, values, dignity in death, and so on, of the patient him 
																																																						
23 Cf. Parfit 1987: 323. 
24 I discuss further limits on reasonable disagreement about death in the next section. 
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or herself.25 Conversely, for the state to endorse an earlier standard requires restraint of 
those whose moral convictions still direct them to treat the patient as a living person, and 
for whom a premature declaration of death will be taken to evince, primarily, an 
abominable disregard for the latter’s still-operative basic rights. Under consensus 
liberalism, what is crucial is that those who stand to be coerced in these ways can, no matter 
how vehemently they dissent from the law on death, nonetheless be said to have received 
a proper public justification for it. 
Such justification will not be possible, however, if, in order to reason one’s way to 
a conclusion about how death should be legally defined, one has no choice but to take 
sides, explicitly or implicitly, between reasonably-rejectable understandings of our essence 
and identity. Instead, insofar as the required deliberative route to a policy conclusion is 
blocked by the Rawlsian requirement of neutrality between reasonable metaphysical 
doctrines, the determination of death will be a question on which the rules of public 
reasoning produce indeterminacy. I use the term ‘indeterminacy’ here in a technical sense 
attributable to Gerald Gaus.26 Public reason is indeterminate in this sense when the 
considerations to which it permits appeal fail to provide deliberators with sufficient 
warrant to choose one way or another between the options on the table. Indeterminacy so 
defined is to be distinguished from what Gaus calls inconclusiveness, which occurs when the 
admissible reasons enable decision-makers to reach multiple competing conclusions, but 
no further public reasons can be adduced that would facilitate agreement over which is 
																																																						
25 As an illustration of such sentiments, consider for instance the inscription on the grave of Nancy Cruzan, 
whose family engaged in a high-profile battle in the US court system to have her life support discontinued 
after she fell into an irreversibly nonconscious state: ‘DEPARTED JAN 11, 1983/AT PEACE DEC 26, 
1990’. Cited in McMahan 2002: 423. 
26 See Gaus 1996: 151-158. For informative further discussion of the distinction, see Schwartzman 2004: 
193-8. 
	 16 
best or most reasonable. Put in further Gausian terms, inconclusiveness occurs when two 
or more options have public justifications that are neither defeated (that is, refuted by some 
publicly-eligible reason) nor victorious (proven beyond reasonable doubt).27 In cases of 
indeterminacy, by contrast, we cannot even get that far: whatever political conclusions our 
full, comprehensive perspective might have enabled us to draw, the public reasons on hand 
do not add up to ‘the minimum degree of proof required for either justified acceptance or 
rejection’ of any relevant policy alternative.28 
Consensus liberals have sometimes argued that inconclusive justification is an 
endemic feature of political life, which a polity can accommodate without abandoning the 
ideal of public reason.29 Insofar as public reason is found to be indeterminate, however, I 
believe consensus liberalism faces a more serious challenge. This is because, as we shall see 
in more detail later, in cases of inconclusiveness it is consistent with Rawlsian values for 
us to select between policy options via the familiar devices of democratic politics, such as 
majority voting. But should public reason prove indeterminate, the deadlock will be 
breakable only by resort to rather more unusual and unappealing procedural mechanisms. 
Before considering, however, how damaging it would be to public reason should it prove 
indeterminate on the matter of defining death, our more immediate task is to confirm 
whether the appearance of indeterminacy observed so far is confirmed on further 
inspection. We need to confirm, in other words, whether there is any viable non-
metaphysical form of reasoning about death that is generally available to Rawlsian 
deliberators. Over the next four sections, I will argue that there is not. The terms of 
citizens’ duty of civility, we shall see, prohibit them from publicly invoking, or factoring 
																																																						
27 Gaus 1996 at, e.g., p. 151. 
28 Gaus 1996: 153. 
29 See especially Schwartzman 2004. 
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into their decision-making, precisely the considerations needed if they are to reliably reach 
even inconclusively-justified verdicts in this complex and morally-fraught policy area. 
 
4. Death and the political conception of the person 
The natural place to begin our inquiry is by asking whether a conclusion about the 
determination of death could be derived from the Rawlsian ‘political conception of the 
person’ (hereinafter ‘PCP’). For the purpose of the PCP is precisely to fulfil the role in 
democratic deliberation that comprehensive conceptions of the person typically perform 
in ordinary moral reasoning. 
Let us first take stock of the PCP’s main features. Like the other political concepts 
and values on which public reasoning depends, Rawls presents the PCP as one of the 
‘fundamental ideas’ that characterise the tradition of democratic thought, and are latent 
within the ‘public political culture’ of a democratic society. 30 It represents, he thinks, the 
distinctive way in which democratic citizens view themselves and their peers. Indeed, the 
PCP understands a person in terms of citizenship: as an individual who can take part in 
public life, in virtue of her possession, to a sufficient degree, of certain cognitive capacities 
and moral sensibilities – namely, the ‘moral powers’ of rationality and reasonableness. 
Rawls sometimes formulates the PCP in such a way as to imply that, unless an 
individual possesses the relevant endowments at a given time, she is not a person at that 
time. For instance, he writes that ‘we think of persons as rational and reasonable, as free 
and equal citizens, with the two moral powers and having, at any given moment, a determinate 
conception of the good, which may change over time.’31 When the PCP is understood in 
this way, many human beings, such as children, or those who were once cooperators, but 
																																																						
30 Rawls 2005: 14, and 29-35. 
31 Rawls 2005: 481-2 [emphasis added, footnote deleted]. 
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whose mental capacities are now too diminished, do not qualify. And a requirement that 
public reasoning be informed by this version of the PCP would accordingly seem at 
serious risk of generating a raft of unpalatable conclusions concerning the rights and 
permissible treatment of those excluded. On other occasions, however, Rawls observes 
a more capacious understanding of the person at work within the democratic tradition. On 
the latter, ‘we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully 
cooperating member of society over a complete life.’32 In allowing that a person need only 
fulfill the role of citizen over the course of a complete life, this formulation of the PCP 
draws in members of society who do not yet possess the requisite capacities but will, and 
those who no longer possess them but did.33 Call this the inclusive PCP, in contrast to the 
exclusionary variant identified at the top of this paragraph. 
As I understand it, it is the inclusive PCP that consensus liberalism accepts, and 
requires reasonable citizens to endorse. Were this not so, Rawls could not coherently claim, 
for instance, as he does, that children are equal beneficiaries of justice from any reasonable 
perspective.34 Moreover, Rawls does not merely stipulate that the more inclusive 
formulation applies – he justifies consensus liberalism’s adoption of it, on grounds that it 
is needed to ‘go with’ the democratic conception of society.35 On the latter, society is 
understood as a collective enterprise of a certain scope. It is not a mere ‘association’, of 
the kind that one is free to join or leave at will once one reaches ‘the age of reason’, thereby 
																																																						
32 Rawls 2005: 18 [emphasis added]. 
33 To be sure, it continues to exclude those permanently incapable of participation in social life. Yet while I 
believe this is a matter of concern, it falls outside the aims of this paper to consider the consequences of that 
residual exclusion for public reasoning here. 
34 Rawls 2005: 474. 
35 Rawls 2005: 18. 
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acquiring or divesting oneself of its package of rights and obligations.36 Rather, a 
democratic society is ‘a more or less complete and self-sufficient scheme of cooperation, 
making room within itself for all the necessities and activities of life, from birth until 
death.’37 ‘We add the phrase “over a complete life”’ when specifying the extent to which 
persons must be able to participate in public life, Rawls tells us, to reflect this fact about 
the bounds of the societal relationship.38 Rawls’s view, thus, appears to be that the inclusive 
PCP is the more faithful rendering of the conception of ourselves presupposed by the 
distinctive democratic mode of societal organisation. 
Accordingly, in what follows my argument will be predicated, unless otherwise 
indicated, on the assumption that it is the inclusive PCP that is found among reasonable 
people’s stipulated shared commitments, and hence lies within the content of public 
reason. I shall, however, consider in the paper’s concluding section the possibility of 
amending the PCP to the exclusionary formulation as a means of combatting the 
indeterminacy problem I am in process of outlining. Suffice it to say for now that, given 
the implications of adopting the exclusionary PCP, the assumption that consensus 
liberalism subscribes instead to its inclusive sibling is not unfavourable to the theory. 
 Because it includes the idea of a citizen’s leading a complete life, without specifying 
a point of terminus, it would seem correct to say - if it does indeed turn out to be the case 
that public reason is indeterminate on what death consists in - that the location of that 
																																																						
36 Rawls 2005: 41 et circa. 
37 Rawls 2005: 18. In addition to being a ‘complete’ social system in the foregoing sense, Rawls suggests here 
and elsewhere that, for purposes of developing a political conception of justice, it is appropriate to model a 
democratic society as ‘closed’ – that is, without inward or outward migration – such that entry and exit are 
by birth and death only. But the stipulation of closedness, he stresses (at p. 12), can only be a temporary 
theoretical convenience (unlike, assumedly, the characterisation of a democratic society as complete). 
38 Rawls 2005: 18. 	
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indeterminacy is the PCP itself. There is, however, one part of Rawls’s discussion of the 
PCP that might be taken to suggest, if obliquely, that this piece of theoretical machinery 
contains further features that can facilitate a resolution to the problem of legally defining 
death. 
 I have in mind Rawls’s seldom-discussed suggestion that the PCP incorporates the 
idea of a citizen’s ‘public, or institutional, identity, or their identity as a matter of basic 
law.’39 His brief remarks about public identity reveal that he conceives of it as having 
synchronic and diachronic dimensions.40 That is, it provides a standard for the 
identification of citizens by the state at a time, and for their re-identification over time, for 
such purposes as determining their legal rights and share of resources. As with the PCP 
generally, Rawls suggests that the conception of public identity relevant to public reason 
is distinctively democratic; other kinds of society, he says, may employ different 
understandings of when their members continue or cease to be persons, or the same 
persons, under law. Unfortunately, however, Rawls does not say what he thinks the 
democratic criterion of public identity might be. Instead, he only illustrates it with an 
example: under the relevant criterion, he says, someone undergoing religious conversion 
does not become a different person, or cease to be a person, and conversion is accordingly 
irrelevant to our legal rights. But while Rawls demurs on the question of what the 
democratic criterion of public identity consists in, it would be natural to anticipate that, if 
it exists, it could be used to yield a corresponding public criterion of a person’s death, or 
final exit from social relations. This would presumably be uncovered, as is done with 
metaphysical accounts of personal identity, by following the identity relation forward in 
																																																						
39 Rawls 2005: 30. 
40 See Rawls 2005: 30-2. 
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time to the point at which it ceases to hold between the person in question and anyone in 
the future. 
This suggestion, while intriguing, faces an obvious problem. For the PCP is 
expressly designed to stand apart from longstanding philosophical controversies over the 
nature of our identity and existence, not to provide a basis for wading into and resolving 
them. Rawls says that the problem of personal identity 
 
raises profound questions on which past and current philosophical views widely differ and 
surely will continue to differ. For this reason it is important to develop a political 
conception of justice that avoids this problem as far as possible.41 
 
He claims on behalf of the PCP that 
 
[i]f metaphysical suppositions are involved, perhaps they are so general that they would 
not distinguish between the metaphysical views … with which philosophy has traditionally 
been concerned. In that case they would not appear to be relevant … one way or the 
other.42 
 
And he implies that the idea of public identity in particular is general enough to be 
acceptable to citizens with a broad range of metaphysical commitments, saying ‘all agree, 
I assume, that for purposes of public life, Saul of Tarsus and St. Paul the Apostle are the 
same person. Conversion is irrelevant to our public, or institutional, identity.’43 This would 
all be an extraordinarily misleading way of presenting the PCP, if the truth were that it 
																																																						
41 Rawls 2005: 32 n34. 
42 Rawls 2005: 29 n31. 
43 Rawls 2005: 32 n34. 
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came with determinate and contentious commitments regarding when a person should be 
taken by the state to have ceased to be. 
 It might be replied that in the foregoing quotations Rawls somewhat overstates the 
degree of metaphysical equidistance required in the specification of the PCP. What is 
needed is not, as Rawls seems to suggest, general acceptability to those who hold one of 
the competing views in the philosophical debate, but neutrality among those views that are 
reasonable. As I noted above, reasonableness, on the Rawlsian understanding, is a matter of 
acceptance of certain central holdings of the democratic tradition: as Rawls himself puts 
it, public reason ‘does not trespass on citizens’ comprehensive doctrines so long as those 
doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity’.44 If, then, it could be confirmed that 
particular commitments regarding our identity, persistence conditions, and death are latent 
within the basic moral framework of such a society then the fact that certain philosophical 
perspectives are incompatible with these commitments would be no obstacle to 
incorporating them into the PCP. The question, then, becomes one of whether there are 
indeed any such commitments identifiable within the tradition of democratic thought. 
There is some initial cause for optimism here. For the democratic tradition, as 
glossed by Rawls, does indeed appear incompatible with at least some understandings of 
personal identity and their practical implications that individuals might conceivably hold. 
Suppose, for instance, that on one view whenever we fall asleep we cease to exist, and the 
individual who wakes up is a different person. Proponents of this view might take it to 
have a range of unusual implications – for instance, that it is wrong to hold a person, Y, 
morally responsible for what his physically and psychologically continuous predecessor, X, 
did the previous day, or that it is wrong to burden X for the sake of benefits to Y.45 This 
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45 For discussion of the ethical implications of a view of this sort, see Olson 2010. 
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seems a paradigmatically unreasonable position, insofar as it conflicts with the idea of 
personal responsibility, and of the pursuit and refinement of a conception of the good over 
a prolonged period of time, that Rawls identifies as part of the democratic view of what it 
means to be free. 
It is not enough, however, for the PCP to provide guidance at the margins of the 
debate, by ruling out certain idiosyncratic outlying views. If the PCP is to be the source of 
a solution to public reason’s apparent indeterminacy on death, it must also provide grounds 
for choosing among the criteria on which the public and philosophical debates have 
centred, such as those described earlier in this paper. Yet, try as I might, I cannot see how 
it could do so. For to the extent that it is possible to discern an understanding of a person’s 
public or institutional identity within democratic public culture at all, it is too loose or 
inchoate to do the necessary work. The best way to confirm this seems to be to attempt 
to evaluate the accounts of identity, existence, and death described in section 3 on the basis 
of their liberal or democratic credentials. If one does this one sees that, whatever one might 
make of their respective philosophical merits, there is none among them that it would be 
remotely plausible to impugn on the basis that they are insufficiently in keeping with a 
democratic polity. These views are, as I have suggested, objects of reasonable disagreement.46 
																																																						
46 Matthew Kramer, I anticipate, would object to this statement. In new work (Kramer 2017: ch. 3) he offers 
a critique of Rawlsian public reason that has, if I understand it aright, strong affinities with the 
incompleteness objection, and which he articulates primarily with reference to abortion. Perhaps Kramer’s 
central claim (for which see especially pp. 110, 115, and 144-6) is that, where the PCP fails to specify whether 
certain beings fall within its scope, we cannot say of those involved in the dispute over the moral or 
metaphysical status of those beings whether their perspectives are reasonable. We can pronounce on their 
reasonableness, he thinks, only when we have resolved the philosophical debate between them. For only 
then will we know whether the beings at issue are ‘in fact moral persons’ (Kramer 2017: 115), and hence 
which of the disputants envisage treating them consistently with the values of interpersonal freedom and 
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It should not, then, be a surprise that Rawls failed to identify what the conception 
of citizens’ institutional identity found in democratic public culture consists in: insofar as 
it exists, it is too coarse-grained to articulate with any precision. It is, then, too coarse-
grained to settle the question of whether, for example, the loss of the capacity for 
consciousness, or self-consciousness, or psychological continuity, is compatible with a 
person’s survival. Liberal democracy, as a system of ideas, is simply not, so to speak, complete 
or comprehensive in the required respect. 
 
5. Death as a biological concept 
The PCP, I have argued, is of scant help in enabling public reasoners to reach a determinate 
conclusion about the definition of death. It may seem to some Rawlsians, however, that I 
have been looking for an answer to our question in the wrong place. Death, it might be 
said, it not something that happens only to persons, but to all life. It is therefore a biological 
concept. Thus, the appropriate way for a democracy governed by public reason to arrive 
at a legal criterion of death is for it to treat the question as a scientific rather than a 
philosophical one, to be resolved in accordance with the evidence and conclusions put 
forward by the relevant experts. 
 If death is a scientific concept, it is a heavily disputed one. There exists no 
consensus, either among members of the public or the scientific community, over how 
our death is best defined in theory, or which criterion of death should be adopted in 
																																																						
equality. Pace Kramer, however, further moral and metaphysical argument of the ordinary kind cannot 
retroactively transform the content of the reasonable. For reasonableness is just what consensus liberalism 
stipulates it to be. The perspectives on death described in section 3 are properly accounted reasonable, I 
contend, in that they are compatible with all those commitments about persons and their relations that 
Rawlsian reasonable citizens, qua liberal democrats, are definitionally required to accept. Their disagreement 
is on a question which the PCP, as one element of those commitments, fails to settle.	
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practice. This, however, poses a serious difficulty for the suggestion that the political 
problem of death should be resolved by appeal to science. For while it is indeed permissible 
under the rules of public reason to draw on scientific evidence and expertise, there are 
significant caveats. 
Rawls addresses the place of science in public reason while setting out what he 
refers to as the ‘guidelines of inquiry’.47 The purpose of these guidelines is to further 
regulate the way in which citizens evaluate the applicability and implications of their 
abstract political values and principles in the concrete circumstances they face, and 
especially their use of empirical evidence and predictions in so doing. In essence, the 
guidelines of inquiry impose a general constraint, over and above consensus liberalism’s 
headline requirement of non-reliance on reasonably-rejectable comprehensive doctrines, 
on political appeals to arcane or specialist academic ideas that are opaque to, or contentious 
among, ordinary citizens. ‘As far as possible’, Rawls says when describing the guidelines, 
‘the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the principles of justice 
and their application to constitutional essentials and basic justice are to rest on plain truths 
now widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally.’48 Thus, citizens may not invoke 
‘elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, when these are in dispute.’49 And 
they may likewise appeal to the ‘methods and conclusions of science’ only when ‘not 
controversial.’50 Indeed, in a striking passage, Rawls suggests that the reasoning of scientific 
experts regarding the risk to the population from a nuclear accident is non-public in the 
same way as the reasoning of a religious group concerning some article of faith.51 These 
																																																						
47 Rawls 2005: 223-6. 
48 Rawls 2005: 225. 
49 Rawls 2005: 225. 
50 Rawls 2005: 224. 
51 Rawls 2005: 220. 
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restrictions rule out selecting a legal definition of death on the basis of scientific testimony, 
just as surely as they rule out doing so on the basis of clerical authority. 
 Rawls’s suggestion that complex and controversial scientific advice cannot be 
relied upon in public justification is made repeatedly, and is thus not a mere slip. But it 
might be argued that it is not a well-considered aspect of his view, which consensus liberals 
can safely jettison. Catriona McKinnon, for example, has proposed to amend the ideal of 
public reason to permit appeal to controversial scientific evidence and conclusions, within 
limits of reasonable disagreement to be determined by the community of relevant experts 
itself.52 Her particular concern is that, absent such modification, public reason would not 
be fit for purpose in formulating policy on climate change. The importance of evidence-
based policy-making does not in itself, however, show that we should amend rather than 
abandon consensus liberalism. To decide that, we need to know whether admitting 
controversial scientific submissions into democratic deliberation can be reconciled with 
the moral values animating the theory, and hence whether doing so would be more than 
an ad hoc amendment. Insofar as the relevant values condemn the oppressiveness of 
coercing people on the basis of claims to deference in judgement by supposed authorities 
whom they reasonably do not recognise, it is not obvious why scientific authority should 
not be, as Rawls suggests, regarded as of a piece with ecclesiastical and philosophical 
authority from the point of view of public reason.53 
The role of science within public reason is an ongoing problem, which deserves 
attention that I cannot give it here. Fortunately, however, doing so is not required. For 
																																																						
52 See McKinnon 2012: 21-30. 
53 Some public reason theorists may embrace this conclusion. Gaus, for instance (who is admittedly not a 
consensus liberal), has argued (2011: 251-3) that justificatory reliance on expert testimony is permissible only 
if the coerced have sufficient grounds, at the bar of their own evaluative standards, to accept that those 
offering it are indeed experts. 
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even if the best interpretation of the ideal of public reason permits appeal to disputed 
scientific expertise, the question of when we die is not, I believe, one that science can 
resolve under its own steam without the addition of controversial metaphysical premises. 
This follows most clearly if, as we accepted provisionally in section 3, for someone 
to die is for her to cease to exist. While science specifies various candidate criteria of death 
(cardiopulmonary, whole-brain, neocortical, and so on), and is able to identify clinical 
investigations to confirm whether they have been met, and assess the reliability of those 
investigations, it cannot tell us which criterion marks our ceasing to exist. For it cannot tell 
us our essential kind or persistence conditions. 
This, however, is not the end of the matter. For while the view that death equals 
our ceasing to exist - sometimes referred to as the termination thesis - is plausible and widely 
held, it is controversial. Critics of the thesis contend that there is a conceptual wedge to be 
driven between death and nonexistence. It has been argued, for instance, that we ought to 
accept that a being can be first alive, and then cease to exist, without dying. The amoeba 
that ceases to exist by dividing, or the embryo in the womb that ceases to exist by fusing 
with its sibling, are alleged examples. Conversely, some people also think that a thing that 
is now living could die and yet continue to exist. This is not only a commitment of religious 
believers in an afterlife. For on some views it is also true to say that an animal or person 
that dies, rather than ceasing to exist, continues to exist as a dead animal or person.54 
Insofar as there is indeed a conceptual divide between death and nonexistence, such that 
to specify the conditions of our ceasing to exist is not straightforwardly, or pari passu, to 
specify the conditions of our death, this fact might be taken to throw into doubt the 
relevance of personal identity theory for the medico-legal criterion of death. Indeed, David 
Shoemaker has suggested that the existence of such a divide refutes the relevance of personal 
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identity to this public policy question. He says that it would be ‘bizarre’ to say that the 
amoeba that divides thereby dies, and that it is at least an ‘open question’ whether one 
would have died if one ‘magically popped out of existence’.55 And he concludes on that 
basis that ‘[c]easing to exist doesn’t entail dying, and unless that’s the case it seems that 
what’s relevant for the definition of death remains independent of considerations of 
personal identity.’56 It would be tempting to suppose that Shoemaker’s argument must be 
helpful to the consensus liberal cause. One might reason that if, as Shoemaker avers, 
determining the conditions of our death is not a task for personal identity theory, then it 
must instead be a task for biological science. And if that is right, one might then naturally 
conclude, it suffices to show that the justification of laws or public policies relating to 
death can remain freestanding of controversial metaphysics, as public reason requires. I 
believe, however, that to reason in this way would be a mistake. 
For a start, the mere fact (if it is a fact) that death and ceasing to exist are not 
equivalent ideas is insufficient to justify the conclusion that the definition of death ‘remains 
independent of considerations of personal identity’. For it is possible that personal identity 
theory has an indispensable role to play in identifying the conditions under which we die 
even if the termination thesis is false. To determine whether this is indeed so, we need to 
know not only that the concepts of death and ceasing to exist diverge, but precisely how. 
Shoemaker does not provide an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
thing to be properly regarded as having died. Yet suppose that, in deference to people’s 
intuitions about amoebas and embryos, say, we propose that death be understood as 
ceasing to exist by means other than fission or fusion. This would be to reject the 
termination thesis while retaining the relevance of personal identity to the definition of 
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death. To be sure, it resolves Shoemaker’s ‘open question’ of whether magically popping 
out of existence equals death in favour of the view that it does; but this point is at least 
arguable.57 I emphasise that it is not my aim to defend the foregoing understanding of the 
death/nonexistence distinction, or any other.58 Instead, the relevant point given our 
concerns is that to take a stand on the termination thesis - or, more broadly, to provide an 
account of the relationship between life, death, existence, and nonexistence - is itself to 
engage in metaphysical argument. To claim that the conditions of our death are to be 
obtained from biological science, on grounds that the question is freestanding of personal 
identity, given the nonequivalence of dying and ceasing to exist, is to rely on a metaphysical 
thesis that some citizens will reasonably deny. To coerce the latter on those grounds, 
therefore, would still be a violation of the terms of public reason. 
In short, the claim that the conditions for our death can be identified without 
appeal to personal identity is not to be confused with the claim that this can be done 
																																																						
57 It has been said in support of the termination thesis, that, if someone ceases to exist, she must no longer 
be alive, from which it follows that she must have died. See, e.g., Luper 2016. Shoemaker (2010: 488) 
questions this, suggesting that it is plausible to think, of a person who magically ceases to exist, that she is 
now neither alive nor dead. Yet suppose we focus on the concept of survival rather than that of being alive. 
If someone ceases to exist, she fails to survive; but to say that someone did not survive seems equivalent to 
saying that she died. 
58 For an account of what it means for something (whether a person or any other living thing) to die that is 
in some respects similar to - though considerably more nuanced than - the proposal mooted in the text, see 
Gilmore 2012. Gilmore argues that to die is to lose the capacity to live without undergoing certain kinds of 
fission, fusion, or metamorphosis. If I understand him aright, he thinks that his account does not rule out a 
continued role for personal identity theory in specifying the conditions of death for a person, since the 
candidate theories can vie for the status of the best explanation of what it means for someone to have the 
capacity to live. And even if I have misinterpreted him on that point, this is clearly a view that someone 
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without appeal to metaphysics. Indeed, to underscore the inescapability of metaphysics in 
this area, suppose that one were to publicly affirm (contrary, as I have argued, to the limits 
of public reason) that it is not as minds, or psychological continuants, but as organisms 
that we die, and that death is not to be understood as the failure of preservation of 
numerical identity, but rather as the cessation of the somatic functionings required for an 
organism to be alive.59 Even given these hefty assumptions, science cannot provide us with 
a definition of death unaided. For the question of what level and kinds of somatic 
functionings are required in an organism if one is to say that it is living is itself metaphysical: 
it remains outstanding even when one knows all the facts about the processes taking place 
within its body.60 Just as science does not, for instance, independently settle the question 
of whether a fissioning amoeba dies or undergoes deathless annihilation, so it does not 
settle the question of whether or how far a living human organism is to be defined with 
reference to continued neurological functioning. 
I conclude, then, that public reasoners cannot rely on science to explain how our 
death is to be conceived, or which criterion of death ought to be adopted in medical 
practice and policy. Scientists clearly have views about these matters. But they are not 
acting only in their capacity as scientists when they expound them. 
 
6. Patient interests 
Rawlsian deliberators, we have seen, cannot reason their way to a legal criterion of death 
either by consulting their shared democratic conception of the person, or by referring the 
matter to biological science. A third alternative, however, may seem more promising. A 
political community’s concerns, a consensus liberal might next emphasise, do not lie in the 
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60 This was recognised, for instance, by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008: 49). 
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conceptual analysis of death for its own sake. Rather, as citizens and lawmakers, our 
interest in death is practical: we need to determine under what conditions the law should 
allow us to treat a person as having died. And what is centrally relevant to this moral 
question, the Rawlsian might add, is not whether the patients whom we propose to treat 
as dead are truly so, but rather whether we would thereby cause them harm. Accordingly, 
this new proposal goes, we should reframe the debate over death as a question of what is 
required by respect for the interests or wellbeing of patients whose metaphysical status is 
in dispute. Call this ‘the moralised approach’ to reasoning about death. In adopting it, it 
may seem that we would shift the focus from a philosophical problem that public reason 
has no authority to consider, onto matters of justice that fall squarely within its 
competence. 
The moralised approach is a familiar perspective in the bioethical debate on 
death.61 Some advocate it in part because they think that, until the heart and lungs stop 
working, and the body begins to disintegrate, there is no fact of the matter about whether 
a person has died. All of its proponents emphasise that even if someone is alive, it does 
not follow that they have a stake in their life being continued, or that their wellbeing can 
be affected by anything we might do to them.62 The latter point is generally illustrated with 
reference to organ donation. Current social attitudes and medico-legal practice both 
																																																						
61 See, e.g., Rachels 1986: 42-3, or Veatch 1993. 
62 The moralised approach also derives support from Derek Parfit’s famous thesis (in Parfit 1987: ch.s 12 
and 13) that personal identity, or the truth about our survival, is not ‘what matters’ for purposes of 
determining when it would be rational to show prudential concern about what will happen in the future. I 
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maintain neutrality on personal identity, and if (as I go on to argue in this section) it also cannot resolve the 
question of when life ceases to be worth living, then it cannot speak to the question of the conditions under 
which prudential or first-personal concern about the future is justified either. 
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endorse the so-called ‘dead donor rule’, whereby vital organs may be removed from a 
patient only once dead. And it is standardly assumed that, to determine whether the dead 
donor rule is satisfied, what matters is whether someone is truly dead. For proponents of 
the moralised approach, however, this is a mistake.  Instead, as James Rachels puts it, the 
relevant question is: ‘At what point does the donor no longer have any use for the 
organs?’63 Parallel questions are to be asked with respect to other death-related conduct, 
such as disconnection from life support, redistribution of the person’s estate, and so on. 
Most proponents of the moralised approach appear to believe the law should 
continue to identify a criterion of death, and withhold legal permission to engage in 
activities such as burial and organ removal until after it is satisfied. Their suggestion is that 
our judgements about when these activities are ethically acceptable should determine the 
criterion of death, rather than the other way around. It is, however, worth highlighting the 
possibility that, if citizens were to engage in moral reasoning about the permissibility of 
these acts on a case-by-case basis, they could be drawn to a more radical conclusion: that 
death ought to be effectively abolished as a legal concept. For there is no guarantee that 
citizens’ reasoning would lead them to think that there must be a single point in the decline 
of the functioning of a human brain and body to which all hitherto death-related activities 
need be tied.64 Thus, deliberators might regard the search for a legal criterion of death to 
have been entirely superseded by a series of discrete questions about when, given the 
requirements of respect for patients’ interests, organ retrieval and so on are to take place. 
For convenience, in what follows I will continue to speak as though the political question 
for which public reason requires an answer is ‘When should the law say that a person is to 
be pronounced dead?’ Readers can, however, mentally add the caveat that the relevant 
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64 For an argument to that effect, see Halevy and Brody 1993. 
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question could instead be rendered as something like: ‘When should the law allow us to 
carry out the set of activities which current conventions link to the occurrence of death?’ 
The assessment I will give of public reason’s ability to answer the former question also 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to its ability to answer the latter. 
The view that the law on determining death should be formulated on the basis of 
patient interests has been criticised by those who believe that the metaphysics of death has 
at least some moral significance in its own right.65 For present purposes, this debate is 
irrelevant: what matters is whether the moralised approach is open to Rawlsian 
deliberators, and would enable them to reach determinate policy conclusions. For two key 
reasons, the answer is ‘no’. 
The first reason is that, peculiarly enough, owing to certain complexities in the 
structure and content of public reason, the moralised approach does not enable citizens to 
successfully bypass the prohibited question of the metaphysics of death as intended. The 
explanation for this lies in the fact that, as I have argued in greater detail elsewhere, the 
moral considerations that count as eligible grounds in Rawlsian public reason for the 
imposition of a law pertain exclusively to the moral status, entitlements, and interests of 
persons, as defined under the PCP.66 This creates a problem in the present context, because 
the question of whether the beings whose interests are centrally at issue when we are trying 
to decide whether some death-related activity is to be legally permitted ought still to be 
accounted political persons turns on their personal identity.  
These claims require some unpacking. Consider first the claim that, when engaging 
in public reason, the moral considerations that may be factored into the justification of the 
use of state power relate only to what is due to political persons. This follows from the 
																																																						
65 See, e.g., DeGrazia 2005: 139-42. For a nuanced perspective, see McMahan 2002: 443-50. 
66 See Williams 2015, especially at 30-33. 
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requirement that public justifications rest only on political values that reasonable citizens 
share. As we have seen, the values which reasonable citizens share are limited to freedom, 
equality, fair cooperation, and public justification (plus, we might add, their various 
necessary entailments). All of these values, however, on their Rawlsian characterisations, 
concern interpersonal rights and relations. That is, they identify, according to Rawls, forms 
of treatment that are appropriate to individuals in virtue of their possession (at least during 
the appropriate periods of normal development) of the cognitive capacities required for 
citizenship.67 That the shared moral horizons of the reasonable are limited in this way is a 
consequence of reasonableness having been defined in terms of acceptance of the basic 
holdings of the democratic tradition. For democracy is (as Rawls himself construes it) 
simply an approach to conducting the political relationship - that is, the relationship of 
persons within the basic structure, whereby they exercise power over one another.68 It does 
not, then, involve any characteristic stance on our ethical obligations to the planet, or living 
beings in general – not even to human beings in general. Thus, to offer a moral justification 
for political action that is acceptable to all reasonable citizens is to defend that action in 
wholly person-affecting terms. 
Now consider the claim that, for public reasoners to determine whether the 
individuals whose interests are primarily at stake in the choice of a criterion of death should 
be understood as persons, they must invoke considerations of personal identity. As we saw 
in section 4, according to the (inclusive) PCP, a person is not necessarily someone who 
now has the cognitive powers needed for citizenship, but someone who has them over the 
course of a complete life. Of course, none of the moral patients who might be declared 
																																																						
67 For the claim that these values apply to persons due to their possession of these capacities, see Rawls 2005 
at, e.g., 29-35, 79, 16, and 213. 
68 See Rawls 2005 at, e.g., 216-7. 
	 35 
dead under the reasonable conceptions of death canvassed in this paper still possess such 
powers. This means, however, that to assert that they are persons, whose interests count 
in public reason, one must identify them as late stages of individuals who earlier possessed 
those powers – that is, as numerically identical with such earlier individuals (as opposed 
to, say, beings that previously existed in association with persons, and outlasted them, or 
beings that came into existence only when those persons died). If this is correct then the 
moralised approach does not offer an alternative, for Rawlsian citizens, to reasoning about 
death in metaphysical terms. For to isolate the pool of interests that, from the shared public 
perspective, are relevant to political decision-making, they must settle the question of 
personal identity first. 
Suppose, however, that one rejects my claim that political personhood is a 
necessary condition for a being’s interests to be eligible to be tallied into the public 
justification of a political decision. Suppose, rather, that one takes the view that a being’s 
interest in continued biological life would, whether they are a person or not, be recognised 
as a legitimate basis for imposing a law, at the bar of reasonable citizens’ shared political 
values. There is still a second problem. Under the moralised approach, Rawlsian 
deliberators need to come to a judgement about whether further life would indeed be in 
patients’ interests’ – a judgement, that is, about whether the future still holds any good in 
prospect for them. Yet, to distinguish between understandings of the conditions under 
which life remains worthwhile, or to affirm any one of them as the rationale for choosing 
between legal criteria of death, would be a paradigmatic violation of neutrality between 
reasonable conceptions of the good. So the moralised approach merely directs decision-
makers to swap one prohibited philosophical controversy for another. 
To elaborate: bioethicists who defend the moralised approach typically contend 
that the point at which life ceases to hold prudential value, and death-related activities may 
safely be carried out, is the point at which the capacity for consciousness is lost. But while 
	 36 
the view that life without the possibility of interaction with the world is of no further 
benefit is clearly reasonable and widely shared, so too is its denial: many reasonable people 
believe, on religious or non-religious grounds, that life in a non-conscious state, though 
sadly diminished, remains a precious gift until one breathes one’s last. Moreover, 
reasonable disagreement over what makes human life worth continuing is not confined to 
the question whether life beyond consciousness remains a good: it also ranges over the 
issue of whether and under what conditions life may cease to be a benefit for conscious 
beings. Many individuals, for instance, have come to the conclusion, when contemplating 
a future in a severely demented condition, that there would be no point in going on after 
the unravelling of the faculties of rationality and self-awareness that make them (in the 
Lockean rather than Rawlsian sense) persons. Some think, indeed, that it would be 
intrinsically demeaning to go on in this way. And some may take these claims to be true 
not only of themselves, but of everyone. That these perspectives on the good are 
reasonable can once again be confirmed from the fact that none violates the basic political 
commitments which define the constituency of public justification. To abandon neutrality 
with respect to them, then, would be to transgress the limits of public reason. Yet this is 
precisely what the moralised approach requires. 
This latest impediment to determinacy arises, note, because of what is unavoidably 
involved in our making judgements about the limits of the interest in continued life. Public 
reason requires that citizens appeal only to those aspects of the good that any of their 
reasonable peers can recognise as such, and that they abstain, conversely, from affirming 
any position that is prejudicial to the latter’s complete understandings of the features or 
determinants of a life worth living. It is impossible, however, to advance a perspective on 
whether and to what extent the life of an individual retains prudential value while 
upholding that kind of neutrality. For to pronounce on that question is necessarily to 
engage in an accounting of the sources and varieties of goodness that will be available or 
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foreclosed to the patient if her life is indeed extended. It is, then, necessarily to take a stand 
on whether the things which rival conceptions of the good variously identify as 
contributors to a worthwhile existence are indeed so. 
The latter point bears emphasising, because it helps to show that the way is barred 
to what might otherwise seem a natural Rawlsian response to the problem currently at 
hand.69 This response begins by acknowledging the existence of reasonable disagreement 
over the conditions under which extending biological life can constitute a benefit. But 
instead of concluding that Rawlsian deliberators are accordingly powerless to specify those 
conditions, it instead proposes that, from the perspective of public reason, the point at 
which it is appropriate, ceteris paribus, to treat a human being as dead is the point at which 
it becomes possible for reasonable people to diverge on the question of whether further 
life is capable of serving that being’s interests. To identify when this stage is reached, we 
must consult the beliefs that reasonable people are stipulated to share on the subject of 
the good. And in essence, the relevant beliefs are that persons have three basic or ‘higher-
order’ interests: one interest in developing and exercising each of their two moral powers 
to the degrees required by liberal citizenship, and a third in rationally pursuing their 
determinate conceptions of the good.70 These beliefs imply that, for at least as long as the 
possibility of realising these interests exists, our futures hold the possibility of further good. 
But, the anticipated Rawlsian response now suggests, once an individual’s capacities for 
moral and rational agency have been irreversibly lost, the higher-order interests are no 
longer engaged by the decision whether to extend her life, and reasonableness therefore 
does not require citizens to accept that doing so would be worthwhile. Thus, the point at 
																																																						
69 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer who suggested this response, along with its idea of a ‘political 
conception of a worthwhile existence’, to which I turn momentarily. 
70 See Rawls 2005 at, e.g., 74. 
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which life can no longer be publicly acknowledged as prudential valuable is the point at 
which one no longer possesses the native endowments required for satisfaction of the 
higher-order interests. Insofar as this understanding of the benefits of existence is derived 
from the content of the reasonable, the response concludes, we can appropriately think of 
it as a political conception of a worthwhile life. 
Although this understanding of the scope of the interest in continued life is clothed 
in Rawlsian language, I believe that it does not respect the limits of public reason. Before 
arguing for this claim, however, it is worth noting that the attractions of the envisaged 
solution to public reason’s indeterminacy problem are likely to evaporate for most 
Rawlsians once we clarify what more precisely it implies. For it commits us not merely to 
the view that the irretrievably comatose have no publicly recognisable interest in 
continuing to live, but also to the view those who remain conscious (or indeed self-
conscious), though in a state of dementia or cognitive impairment sufficiently severe to 
preclude active citizenship and rational project pursuit, can likewise be subsumed into the 
category of the dead (at least other things equal). Yet, while it would be reasonable, in the 
specialist Rawlsian sense, for one to think that this is so, it is difficult to overstate just how 
radical - as well as, for all but a few, how deeply unpalatable – this conclusion is. And 
accordingly, if this conclusion is indeed one that citizens must acquiesce in when adopting 
the perspective of public reason, then while consensus liberalism will have evaded the 
incompleteness objection, it will instead be significantly damaged by the fact of its 
conspicuous breach with prevailing considered moral judgements. 
To be sure, a defender of the proposal under examination may want to insist that 
judgements that conflict with the determinations of public reason – whether reached by 
the citizens of a consensus liberal polity, or by political philosophers – are simply to be 
disregarded. But this will not do. It is true, of course, that citizens who prove willing to use 
their political power to resist the policy positions yielded by public reason thereby render 
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themselves unreasonable. But insofar as consensus liberalism seeks to explain how a liberal 
constitutional regime can achieve ‘stability for the right reasons’ – stability, that is, based 
on willing endorsement of the primacy of public reason, as opposed to a mere balance of 
political forces – it cannot remain indifferent to whether otherwise reasonable citizens find, 
in significant number, that the implications of public reason, when teased out, are 
intolerable enough for them to have cause to abandon their duties of civility. On the 
contrary, as Rawls himself writes, consensus liberalism must ‘hope’ that the answers to 
political questions reached by public reason turn out to be within the ‘leeway’ that 
reasonable citizens’ convictions allow them to accept, ‘even if reluctantly’.71 Moreover, 
even consensus liberals who would sever their theory’s connections with the notion of 
stability for the right reasons must be sensitive to whether you and I, here and now, as Rawls 
would put it, find that the practical implications of public reason fall foul of our considered 
judgements in reflective equilibrium.72 For if consensus liberalism fails this philosophical 
test, there is no higher court of appeal, as it were, at which it can be vindicated.  
In any event, I also believe, to reiterate, that what was earlier referred to as the 
political conception of a worthwhile life cannot be put forward within the strictures of 
public reason. Indeed, the phrase ‘political conception of a worthwhile life’ is, it seems to 
me, a contradiction in terms. The fundamental problem with the proposal that public 
																																																						
71 Rawls 2005: 246. 
72 This second consideration remains relevant, then, to, e.g., Jonathan Quong. For while Quong defends an 
‘internal conception’ of consensus liberalism, whereby political arrangements need be acceptable only to a 
hypothetical constituency of reasonable citizens whose commitment to upholding the outcomes of public 
reasoning never wavers, he nonetheless accepts, if I understand him correctly, that consensus liberalism must 
be justified to us, from the perspective of the philosopher, in reflective equilibrium. See Quong 2011: ch.s 5-
6 (on the internal conception), and 155-6 (on the role of reflective equilibrium in justifying consensus 
liberalism).  
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reasoners take up this conception is, I submit, as follows. To say that, as far as the public 
point of view is concerned, there are no grounds for prolonging life after the loss of the 
moral powers is to say, by implication that, from that same point of view, hedonic pleasure, 
for example, or the satisfaction of whatever preferences individuals without moral and 
rational agency may still be capable of forming, are not intrinsic contributors to a 
worthwhile existence – contributors, that is, independently of the fact of having been 
chosen by a person as an end. It is therefore to say, by further implication, that citizens 
who follow reasonable conceptions of the good that do regard pleasure, or preference 
satisfaction (or what have you) as intrinsic goods, and direct that they be promoted 
accordingly (within the limits of justice), are wasting their time. These claims will seem 
implausible to many of us. But more pertinently, there would be nothing meaningful left 
of neutrality over the good if consensus liberalism were to permit them to be made. 
Indeed, it is precisely on these grounds, I take it, that Rawls specifically cautions 
us that public reason must abjure evaluations of people’s overall quality of life or level of 
wellbeing.73 He argues that, for political purposes, assessments of how well-off people are 
(or would or will be) should be conducted instead in terms of their shares of primary social 
goods - despite the fact that ‘primary goods are clearly not anyone’s idea of the basic values 
of human life and must not be so understood’.74 Rawls seems not to have anticipated, then, 
that for resolving certain political questions, quality-of-life assessments may be 
indispensable, and the metric of primary goods not an acceptable substitute. In what is, as 
far as I can tell, his sole explicit reference to the interest in continued life, and its relevance 
to political decision-making, Rawls says only that ‘any workable political conception of 
justice that is to serve as a public basis of justification… must count human life… as in 
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general good’.75 The words ‘in general’ here mask public reason’s difficulties (as, for that 
matter, does the word ‘human’). 
I conclude, then, that the moralised approach is a dead end for public reason. I 
have argued that the political values shared by Rawlsian citizens enjoin respect only for the 
interests of political persons, and that public reason is therefore hamstrung by its inability 
to confirm whether human beings at the end of life, whose cognitive endowments have 
decayed, remain persons in the relevant sense, without recourse to metaphysics. If I am 
wrong about that, however, and a being’s interests are to be factored into the public 
justification of political arrangements irrespective of whether they belong to persons, 
public reason will still be unable to identify a point at which a patient’s interest in further 
life runs out without violating neutrality over the good. (Finally, if I am wrong about that 
too, and what public reason instead requires is that citizens acquiesce in the conclusion 
there are no grounds for extending life once the three publicly-recognised higher-order 
interests of persons are no longer engaged, then we have also seen that consensus 
liberalism will still not be saved, but rather exposed to new objections which seem at least 
as grave as the original incompleteness objection.) 
There is a certain irony to these findings. Ethics has recently witnessed 
considerable movement towards the view that the metaphysical truth about our identity 
and survival is of much less practical significance, prudentially and morally, than has 
conventionally been assumed.76 It appears, however, that consensus liberalism, under 
which public justification must be, in Rawls’s famous slogan, ‘political, not metaphysical’, 
cannot derive the expected benefit from these developments. 
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7. Third-party interests 
I have now argued that public reasoners cannot decide between reasonable criteria for 
determining when a person has died by (a) metaphysical reasoning; (b) reasoning about the 
implications of their shared conception of the person; (c) consulting the resources of 
biological science; or (d) reasoning about the way in which the relevant policy options 
would impact upon patients’ interests. Since these options seem to exhaust the viable 
possibilities, I submit that we are justified in concluding at this point that public reason 
does indeed have an indeterminacy problem with respect to the political question of 
death.77 
																																																						
77 If an earlier argument of mine was correct, this conclusion contrasts interestingly with the way public 
reason handles the primary moral problem arising at the beginning of life: abortion. While public reason is 
unable to specify, I have here maintained, whether a range of patients with eroded psychological, 
neurological, and physiological functioning remain living persons under the PCP, or have (publicly-
recognisable) interests that tell against treating them as dead, we can be certain – or so I have contended 
elsewhere - that fetuses are not political persons at any stage of pregnancy, and hence are at no point eligible 
for the protection that that status confers. For even under the inclusive PCP, the political relation between 
persons within the basic structure is taken to extend only between birth and death. By that token, while 
public reason fails to deliver a verdict regarding when we are to be considered dead, its verdict regarding 
abortion seems both determinate and radically permissive (indeed disturbingly so, as most would think). See 
Williams 2015. 
 Matthew Kramer has newly disputed my earlier position. While he is likewise a critic of public 
reason’s management of the abortion controversy, he believes that ‘the Rawlsian conception of persons does 
not in abstracto entail or exclude the personhood of foetuses’ (2017: 152-5). This view requires that Kramer 
discount various statements by Rawls to contrary effect – as when, e.g., Rawls claims (2005: 41) that, before 
entering society by birth, ‘we have no prior identity’. Yet while I think Kramer’s understanding of the PCP 
does not square with the Rawlsian account, I cannot make that case here. Notice, however, that even if his 
interpretation of the PCP were right, it would not follow, as he contends, that resolving the problem of 
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This verdict comes with a caveat. In asking what conclusions Rawlsian deliberators 
would be warranted in drawing about death, I have implicitly assumed that, to make a 
decision, they require access to reasons pertaining to the intrinsic properties of the patients 
who stand to be pronounced dead under the various criteria at issue. Someone might think, 
however, that even if reasons of the latter sort are unavailable, citizens may nonetheless be 
able to make headway by reasoning instead about the effects that implementing the 
candidate criteria may have on the publicly-relevant interests of third parties, or society at 
large. I accept that appeal to third-party-focused reasons might in some societal contexts enable 
public reasoners at least to narrow the field of public policy options – conceivably even to 
the point of resolving the policy question altogether. Yet, it would be a mistake to think 
that the availability of these reasons adequately alleviates the indeterminacy problem that 
I have developed thus far. 
Any attempt by citizens to reason their way to conclusions about when patients 
should be declared dead on grounds of considerations of the foregoing sort would, I take 
it, have to proceed in a particular way. One would have to say that, while public reason 
cannot offer any answer to the question of whether those patients are living persons who 
retain lives of value, the interests of third parties are sufficient to carry the day no 
matter what the answer might be assumed arguendo to be. To be sure, it seems that 
																																																						
abortion via public reasoning is ‘impossible’ (Kramer 2017: 92). Kramer assumes too readily, in particular, 
that appeals to women’s prerogatives to prioritise themselves over their fetuses (irrespective of the latter’s 
moral status) can justify abortion under only rare circumstances, when it seems at least reasonable for a 
citizen to argue that, given the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, such appeals justify abortion frequently, 
or indeed always. Nor does Kramer anticipate that, where public reasoning runs out, consensus liberalism 
might call for a procedural resolution to the problem at hand. And that means, I believe, that like others he 
misses the ultimate practical and moral significance of indeterminacy in public reason, as I develop it below. 
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nobody could reasonably argue, in that vein, that whether or not a patient, P, is assumed 
to be a person with a life worth living at time t1, we should nonetheless go ahead and treat 
him as dead at t1, as a means of securing the benefits that would thereby accrue to, say, 
people on organ waiting lists. For so to argue would express a readiness to engage in the 
instrumentalisation of persons that is incompatible with the special priority of basic rights 
over the general welfare – a priority which, according to Rawls, any sufficiently liberal 
understanding of justice will endorse.78 It does, however, seem possible for citizens to 
argue that, even if P really were dead and beyond harm at t1, he still ought not to be declared 
so, on grounds that adopting the relevant criterion of death would cause too much third-
party harm. Citizens might be able to make a compelling case, for instance, that given 
prevailing social attitudes, pronouncing patients dead at that stage would attract too much 
public hostility, or unduly damage trust in doctors or state officials. 
It seems to me that it would be implausible to try to defend consensus liberalism’s 
handling of the problem of death on grounds that, although it prevents citizens from 
asking morally pertinent questions about patients themselves, it at least allows them to 
whittle down their policy options with reference to their third-party effects. For it would 
be far more natural to conclude that, if public reason forces this degree of reliance on 
third-party interests, its rules are unduly burdensome. Irrespective of its surface plausibility, 
however, reasons pertaining to third-party effects are too contingent on variable social 
circumstances for the envisaged defence of public reason to be relied upon as generally 
applicable. Although such reasons might be an aid to deliberators, given a particular 
confluence of social attitudes, institutions, practices, and so on, we cannot be expected to 
grant that they will always come to the rescue. It is appropriate that public reason be judged 
in part on the basis of its consequences for cases in which, given the social facts, there 
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happens to be no reasonable criterion of death of which citizens could claim, with 
appropriate warrant, that it would cause significant third-party harm, or in which it is clear 
that any such harms would be more than compensated by benefits. 
On these grounds, in what follows I propose to set third-party-focused reasons 
aside as the source of a potential solution to the indeterminacy problem I have identified. 
We can simply stipulate, without extravagance, that we are considering public reason’s 
performance under societal conditions in which these reasons would not provide a catalyst 
to decision-making. 
What would follow from this fact? Proponents of the incompleteness objection 
have generally assumed that, where public reason proves unable to answer some question 
for which its use is mandated under the duty of civility, this suffices to show the 
permissibility of appealing to non-public reasons, and hence the falsity of the claim that 
doing so, within the relevant class of political decisions, is morally wrong. As Andrew 
Williams and Micah Schwartzman have argued, however, that conclusion does not 
follow.79 For selection of a legislative course of action by non-public reason may not be 
the only remaining alternative. And if it is indeed objectionably sectarian to govern free 
and equal persons in accordance with non-public reasons, as consensus liberalism claims, 
then these other possibilities must first be explored. 
 
8. Coping with indeterminacy: five unsuccessful strategies 
Schwartzman has identified no less than five distinct strategies that citizens might employ 
to cope with incompleteness in public reason without reaching for their comprehensive 
doctrines.80  They are: (1) ‘intrapersonal delegation’, or deferral of a decision until later, 
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when further public reasons may have come to light; (2) deference to others who claim to 
have succeeded where one has failed to answer the relevant question by public reason 
alone; (3) moral accommodation between opposing perspectives; (4) calling time on 
deliberation, and proceeding to a majority vote; (5) random adjudication, by a procedure 
such as a coin flip. The efficacy and moral appropriateness of these strategies has so far 
not received much attention, and our investigation provides a good opportunity to do so. 
In this penultimate section I argue that, in the case of indeterminacy over the definition of 
death, the ideal of public reason requires (5), and that, insofar as it does so, the ideal is 
objectionable.81 
 It is not entirely clear how many of Schwartzman’s strategies he takes to be 
applicable to cases of indeterminacy in public reason, as opposed to the different problem 
of inconclusiveness. The only approach which he rules out explicitly – calling it ‘useless in 
the face of indeterminacy’ - is (4).82 It is worth pausing to clarify why. Recall from earlier 
that public reason is indeterminate when it provides, as in the present case, insufficient 
reasons to justify one’s venturing to choose in any way from among the relevant policy 
options, and inconclusive when citizens find that they have sufficient reasons to adopt 
their various competing policy preferences, but public reason cannot bring them into 
agreement regarding which is best justified, by vindicating any option beyond reasonable 
doubt. Democratic selection of an inconclusively justified policy appears fully compatible 
with the ideal of public reason. For the policy imposed is indeed justified, so those who 
propose it can sincerely attest, by a reasonable balance of public reasons, even if many do 
																																																						
81 Some parts of this argument refine and expand upon parallel claims which I have defended elsewhere 
about the utility of Schwartzman’s proposals in the different context of global public reason. See Williams 
2016: 18ff. 
82 Schwartzman 2004: 211. Quong (2013), on the other hand, appears to believe that at least (1), (3) and (5) 
are relevant to indeterminacy. 
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not consider it optimal, or most reasonable. That claim cannot be made, however, where 
public reason is indeterminate. If no policy is supported or ruled out by public reason, then 
citizens who are nonetheless able to reach a judgement must have done so on the strength 
of their comprehensive doctrines. And enforcement of those judgements by a democratic 
majority would be a straightforward violation of the Rawlsian ideal.  
With (4) eliminated, then, let us consider Schwartzman’s other proposals. I assume 
that (1) and (2) are also irrelevant here. For if it is correct that public reason supplies 
insufficient grounds to make a decision about the definition of death because it prohibits 
appeal to the necessary philosophical considerations, then deferring the decision until later, 
or looking to someone else, will not help.  
At first sight, proposal (3), for moral accommodation, might seem no more 
promising. The only form of accommodation that Schwartzman mentions explicitly is 
compromise-brokering. And it may be difficult to imagine what compromise between 
proponents of opposing definitions of death would even look like, let alone to envisage 
the prospects for obtaining one being any more than extremely remote. After all, 
compromise on this issue would generally mean, for one side, acceding to some people’s 
lives being ended prematurely, and for the other agreeing to the pointless squandering of 
organs and other scarce resources. Depending on the factions involved, however, and their 
particular concerns, compromise may sometimes be conceivable. But even if it were, it is 
ruled out in cases of indeterminacy, for reasons that run parallel to those ruling out 
resolution by democratic voting. Suppose that public reason is indeterminate between 
policies P1, P2, and P3, and that the public is split between advocates of P1 and P3. As 
before, since no policy is supported by public reason, if citizens are nonetheless able to 
reason their way into a preference, it must be by reference to their non-public doctrines. 
Compromise on P2, in this context, means agreeing to govern by striking a balance between 
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those doctrines. And that approach to political decision-making is condemned by the 
Rawlsian view as ‘political in the wrong way’.83 
This conclusion also applies to another, somewhat different potential strategy for 
reaching moral accommodation between differing perspectives on death.84 Here we select 
a criterion of death on the basis that all reasonable perspectives can at least agree that its 
satisfaction is sufficient for the death of a person. Assuming a society in which all 
reasonable views are represented, this would presumably yield a criterion of death as the 
irreversible breakdown of biological functioning to the point where both the 
cardiopulmonary and whole-brain standards are met. Moral accommodation in this form 
is not naturally described as compromise, because, while it aims at a policy that is in one 
respect acceptable to all parties (it ensures that nobody will think that the law declares 
people dead prematurely), it is not an attempt to split the difference between existing policy 
proposals, or to find a settlement that the opposing camps themselves deem equally 
satisfactory. Indeed, under current technological constraints, the policy obtained under this 
approach aligns almost exactly with the cardiopulmonary criterion, at the heavy expense 
of all neurological standards, since absent head transplants irreversible cardiopulmonary 
failure makes total brain death unavoidable, thereby satisfying the joint criterion, while 
psychological disintegration and brain death are compatible, as we have seen, with long-
term maintenance of cardiopulmonary function. In common with compromise-brokering, 
however, this proposal is ‘political in the wrong way’. For in the absence of a public 
justification of any particular criterion of death, it again views the political task at hand as 
one of seeking an accord between citizens, addressed in their capacities as holders of rival 
comprehensive doctrines.  
																																																						
83 Rawls 2005 at, e.g., xlv. 
84 I am grateful to Paul Billingham and Jeff McMahan for suggesting that I consider this possibility. 
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There is, however, yet a further form of moral accommodation remaining that 
might fare better. This is what we might call the strategy of privatisation – that is, of ceding 
a political matter to individuals to resolve in their own cases, rather than insisting on a 
unitary community-wide response for all.85 In the current context, privatisation means 
allowing persons to decide what criterion of death will be applied to them. This possibility 
is of particular interest for two reasons. First, some jurisdictions already grant their citizens 
a degree of this sort of discretion. Japan and the American state of New Jersey, for instance, 
have both legislated to allow individuals to exempt themselves from neurological criteria 
of death, out of a concern to accommodate religious beliefs to the effect that (earthly) 
death occurs only once the traditional cardiopulmonary standard is met. Second, some 
bioethicists who are sympathetic to Rawlsian liberalism have advocated privatising the 
decision over the definition of death, precisely as a means of accommodating reasonable 
pluralism over human survival and the value of life.86 As a solution to indeterminacy, 
however, the strategy of privatisation fails. 
 One reason for this is that it can at most obviate the need for the enforcement of 
a collectively-made decision in cases where the wishes of a previously competent person 
are known. Many cases, however, will obviously not be like this. And we cannot avoid this 
problem just by requiring that everyone records a prior personal decision, or by 
implementing a system of presumed consent, whereby the state communicates that it will 
infer that everyone accepts some default criterion of death if they do not opt out. For that 
still leaves the issue of what to do with individuals who, like children, lack the mental 
																																																						
85 While Schwartzman does not discuss privatisation, it is at the heart of Gaus’s approach to overcoming the 
(somewhat different) problem of indeterminacy that he regards as a danger for his version of convergence 
liberalism. See Gaus 2011: ch. VI. 
86 See Zeiler 2009, and DeGrazia 2005: 138. 
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capacity to make their own medical decisions. It does not appear that the community 
would be justified in granting family members, as the designated legal agents of 
incompetent patients, the power to decide when the latter should be declared dead. Rawls 
stresses that any reasonable political conception of justice will perforce accept that citizens 
lack untrammelled authority over their children or other dependent persons in their care, 
and that the state is entitled to intervene in the home to prevent abuse and neglect.87 Yet, 
unless public reasoners can determine how the options placed before a fiduciary agent 
stand to affect the interests of the patient on whose behalf she purports to act, they will 
be unable to judge whether the amount of discretion granted falls within reasonable 
bounds, or constitutes a license to engage in mistreatment. And in any case, for at least 
some incapacitated persons, who lack loved ones, or sufficiently responsible loved ones, 
the appointed agent will be a state official. 
 Even when it comes to persons whose prior wishes are known, however, there is 
a further obstacle. This is that a policy of deferring to these wishes cannot itself be justified 
except by ruling on precisely the sort of contentious philosophical issues that privatisation 
aims to sidestep. To fix ideas, suppose that a hospital patient signs, in an appropriately 
voluntary fashion, an advance medical directive requiring that, in his case, the point at 
which death should be treated as having occurred is the point at which the 
cardiopulmonary standard is fulfilled. Later, he suffers a serious medical complication that 
results in total brain failure, though cardiopulmonary functioning is artificially sustained. 
Is the directive authoritative? That depends on whether the patient remains, at the point 
at which the choice arises whether or not to fulfill its terms, a source of valid claims against 
us, as Rawlsians would put it. But public reason is powerless to answer that question. 
																																																						
87 See Rawls 2005: 466-74.	
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The grounds for the latter claim can likely by now be at least partly anticipated. 
First, public reason cannot take a stand on whether the individual who signed the directive 
still survives as a person under the PCP, to whose treatment the political values apply. And 
nor, second, can it take a stand on whether it matters in any way to the dead, or those 
whose capacity for a mental life has been annihilated, that their earlier wishes be carried 
out. To say that they retain an interest that we so act would be to violate neutrality between 
reasonable conceptions of the good, by contradicting the controversial experience requirement, 
on which an individual’s interests are affected only by things that make a difference to her 
experience. But to say that we ought to respect the determinations of a person’s 
autonomous will irrespective of whether our doing so would benefit her would likewise be 
to venture beyond public reason’s remit. For the public justification of political 
arrangements, according to Rawls, must not rely on any reasonably-rejectable 
understanding of the ethical significance of autonomy.88 Rawls cites the doctrines of Kant 
and Mill in this regard. And I take it that, in giving the examples of those particular thinkers, 
he meant to suggest that it is verboten to appeal to unshared conceptions not only of the 
ways in which respecting people’s autonomous choices may contribute to their good, but 
also of the ways in which doing so may serve values independent of their good – as derived, 
say, from a philosophical account of the nature and demands of human dignity, or of the 
intrinsic or impersonal value of states of the world. Certainly, the rules of public reason 
would seem utterly arbitrary if these species of view were not treated even-handedly. Yet, 
while reasonable citizens necessarily accept that persons have autonomy rights grounded 
in the higher-order interests, there is nothing unreasonable in their taking the view that our 
																																																						
88 Rawls 2005 at, e.g., 78 or 400. 
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reasons to respect people’s choices are exhausted once their good is (as those citizens see 
it) no longer at stake.89 
So much, then, for moral accommodation. At this point, the only one of 
Schwartzman’s coping strategies left standing is (5) - random adjudication. None of the 
other proposals, as we have seen, enables decision-makers to select a policy without 
reliance on non-public reasons. Random adjudication does so – though admittedly only at 
the cost of abandoning the ambition of justifying laws on the basis of a positive balance 
of public reasons. Yet, insofar as the ideal of public reason not only directs citizens to aim 
at public justification, but also requires them to abstain from foisting their non-public 
doctrines on others, it appears, as Schwartzman and Williams claim, that they should avoid 
doing the latter even when they are unable to achieve the former.90 If this is right, then 
given that random adjudication is the only available way to proceed while maintaining 
independence from comprehensive justification, this is what consensus liberalism requires. 
Schwartzman acknowledges that the suggestion that we resolve important political 
problems randomly when public reason proves indeterminate, rather than by inquiring 
after the best available non-public reasons, is likely to strike us as ‘highly implausible, if not 
altogether absurd.’91 In defence of random adjudication, however, he provides an example 
in which it seems like the right thing to do. This is the case of a hospital board charged 
with deciding which of two patients should receive an organ. As Schwartzman constructs 
																																																						
89 Notice that these considerations suggest that public reason has a problem justifying legal recognition not 
only of advance medical directives, but also of people’s wills. To be sure, it is commonly accepted in liberal 
societies that wills ought to be upheld, precisely on grounds of respect for the autonomy of the dead. But it 
is by no means a requirement of reasonableness that one should accept this, and many philosophers of course 
do not. 
90 See Schwartzman 2004: 213, and Williams 2000: 210. 
91 Schwartzman 2004: 212. 
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the example, both individuals are equally suitable from the point of view of public reason: 
the board are able to confirm that they are in equal need, would derive an equal benefit 
from the organ, have spent the same length of time on waiting lists, are equally non-
responsible for their plight, and so forth. Schwartzman then asks whether, given that public 
reason does not identify a preferred candidate, it would be appropriate for board members 
to break the tie by discriminating on the basis of religious affiliation or sinfulness. He 
concludes - and I assume everyone would agree - that deciding the matter on that particular 
basis would be wrong, and that random adjudication is morally required. 
Schwartzman’s example, however, is not entirely apposite to a defence of public 
reason. For the selection of organ beneficiaries on the basis of religious devotion or purity 
does not only fall foul of the ideal of public reason - it also constitutes a violation of 
church-state separation, and of basic religious freedom, to a degree that would be 
condemned by public reason liberals and their critics alike.92 Given the details of 
Schwartzman’s case, it is not only public reasons but reasons of justice generally that have 
been exhausted in the comparison between the two patients. So comprehensive or ethical 
liberals can agree that a coin toss, say, is the appropriate solution. The question here is not 
whether random adjudication is ever called for, but whether public reason forces citizens 
to rely on it excessively. To test that, we need to concentrate on political questions for 
which Rawlsians would have to turn to randomisation before ordinary moral deliberation 
has run its course.   
If the argument of this paper is correct, the legal determination of death is (in at 
least some societal circumstances) just such a question. This example does not work to the 
																																																						
92 For an ethical liberal defence of church-state separation, see Arneson 2014. 
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advantage of consensus liberalism, since the claim that a political community should 
randomly decide the provisions of its laws in this area is intuitively and reflectively 
unacceptable. To resolve this particular problem arbitrarily would mean abstaining from 
asking whether the policy adopted will prematurely end lives that are worth continuing, or, 
conversely, extend biological life past the point of ethical justification, to the detriment of 
(for instance) the supply of life-saving organs. This is to play Russian Roulette with 
people’s lives and wellbeing. And the stakes are all the higher given that the range of 
reasonable understandings of when death should be taken to have occurred seems rather 
broad. As we have seen, reasonable answers to the question of when there is no longer any 
patient-centred objection to pronouncing that death has occurred range from the final 
stages of dementia, when one’s distinctive psychological attributes, or the higher cognitive 
powers associated with personhood, have been lost, through higher and whole brain 
failure, to the point at which the heart and lungs finally stop working. This suggests that 
the menu of policy options between which random adjudication might be called for will 
(except insofar as contingent third-party-focused reasons intervene) in turn be wide. This 
conclusion is at least damaging to consensus liberalism. It would be far from implausible, 
I think, to regard it as a reductio of it. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Rawlsian consensus liberalism requires that the justification of coercive laws (or at least 
the most fundamental laws) be formulated without reliance on reasonably-rejectable claims 
about the basic nature and value of human survival. I have argued, as critics of consensus 
liberalism have often suspected, that fundamental political problems are not always 
susceptible to resolution by public deliberation conducted within these constraints. The 
determination of death provides an example of a political dispute which does not merely 
depend upon but essentially is a dispute about the nature and value of life. One conclusion 
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to be drawn from our investigation, then, is that to forbid democratic engagement between 
rival comprehensive doctrines is in some cases equivalent to forbidding citizens to resolve 
fundamental problems of justice - at least through the use of reason. 
 Another conclusion to be drawn is that the procedural mechanisms which 
Rawlsians have proposed for coping with incompleteness in public reason are not only of 
insufficient help, but in at least some cases exacerbate public reason’s difficulties. The claim 
that indeterminacy should be resolved by random adjudication takes on the objection that 
public reason is sometimes unable to decide what to say about a policy problem, and 
transforms it into an objection that seems more dramatic: that public reason can require 
picking political arrangements in an intolerably arbitrary way. This finding alters the cast 
of the incompleteness objection, by closing the gap between it and what I have elsewhere 
called the ethical objection – the objection, that is, that public reasoning can in some cases 
generate (or be at undue risk of generating) determinate but morally unacceptable 
decisions.93 
 If my assessment of the implications of public reason for the determination of 
death is correct, Rawlsians face a difficult choice how to respond. It would be tempting to 
suppose that problems of incompleteness like this one can be satisfactorily addressed with 
a bit of theoretical tinkering - and more specifically by amending the content of public 
reason to allow extra reasons in, and facilitate better decision-making. But this would seem 
at odds with the fundamental commitments of consensus liberalism. Under the consensus 
model, the justificatory reasons that citizens may invoke depend on the reasons their peers 
can accept. Thus, additions to the content of public reason require corresponding 
amendments to the constituency of public reason. The sine qua non of the Rawlsian view, 
however, is, as we have seen, that the constituency of public reason should be open to all 
																																																						
93 See, e.g., Williams 2015: 49. 
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who subscribe to (the Rawlsian interpretation of) the basic insights of the democratic 
tradition. To discriminate further among persons who are fully reasonable by this standard, 
then, seems an abandonment of this Rawlsian commitment. 
Indeed, doing so would appear to produce a slide from the idea of public 
justification to the so-called correctness-based standard of justification to which ethical liberals 
typically subscribe, under which political decisions are permissibly implemented when 
justified by valid - as opposed to public - reasons.94 The proposal we are now considering 
for restriction of the justificatory constituency is designed to meet an objection to the 
effect that, in its current form, public reason resolves the political question of death in a 
morally unacceptable (because arbitrary) fashion. Given that motivation, however, the 
discrimination called for among the reasonable would presumably have to be on the basis 
that particular beliefs about life and death are needed to facilitate morally better outcomes. 
Yet, once the principle is conceded that it is appropriate to discriminate among the 
reasonable for that purpose, it is doubtful that there could be any principled objection to 
doing so again for other political questions. The circle of justification would then quickly 
close to those with morally sound beliefs on every issue. And, as Lister has noted, the view 
that political justification need only be acceptable to those with sound beliefs is equivalent, 
precisely, to the view that justification should be correctness-based.95 
It might be replied that there is one way in which the content of public reason 
could be revised to circumvent the incompleteness objection while maintaining the 
required distance between consensus and ethical liberalism. This would be to abandon 
public reason’s use of what I earlier called the inclusive PCP, in favour of the PCP’s 
exclusionary reading. You will recall from section 4 that, whereas the inclusive PCP counts 
																																																						
94 The term ‘correctness-based justification’ comes from Wall 2002: 386. 
95 Lister 2013: 40. 
	 57 
us as persons for the duration of our complete lives in society, without specifying when 
that life ends, we remain persons under the exclusive PCP for only as long as we possess 
the moral powers needed for citizenship. Substituting the inclusive for the exclusive PCP, 
a proponent of this move might argue, achieves determinacy without importing alien 
philosophical content from the realm of comprehensive doctrines into the political 
domain. But it is unclear to me, nonetheless, that doing so would be any more consistent 
with consensus liberalism’s founding values. For if Rawls is correct that it is the inclusive 
rather than exclusionary PCP that is presupposed by the democratic tradition then the 
proposal at hand still discriminates against paid-up democrats whom we had previously 
been told are entitled to be counted among the constituency of public justification. It is 
dubious that the fact that the presence of these citizens within the relevant constituency is 
an obstacle to determinacy on some political questions would be a good enough reason, 
by consensus liberal lights, for casting them out. 
Leaving aside the question of whether it would be coherent for consensus liberals to 
endorse adoption of the exclusionary PCP, however, I believe that it would not be prudent 
for them to do so. As with the suggestion we encountered in section 6, to the effect that 
public reason should identify the irretrievable loss of the moral powers as the point beyond 
which further life can no longer be considered in someone’s interests, making the mooted 
change would only succeed in exchanging a problem of indeterminacy for a problem of 
public reason’s yielding conclusions that are dramatically out of step with mainstream 
moral judgements. As I have argued, public reason recognises only the rights and interests 
of persons as legitimate grounds for political action. Thus, for public reason to withhold 
the status of person from someone is, as Rawls himself puts it in the context of slavery, 
for it to deem them ‘socially dead’.96 To pronounce us socially dead, if not literally so, 
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immediately upon the loss of the moral powers needed for citizenship would certainly 
avoid the incompleteness objection as I have developed it. But since, as we have seen, the 
absence of these powers is consistent with the presence of (self-)consciousness - and may 
thus allow for various forms of enjoyment, recognition of and affection towards others, 
and so forth - adoption of the exclusionary PCP would not only not help consensus 
liberals: it would make things considerably worse for them, in two respects. First, it 
multiplies the fronts on which they are exposed, by generating a range of additional 
implausible implications about the status and permissible treatment of individuals who 
have yet to develop the moral powers, in addition to those who have lost them.97 And 
second, even where the end of life alone is at issue, it seems at least somewhat less bad for 
consensus liberalism to require random selection from among the various reasonable 
criteria of death available, as it does when public reason is indeterminate, than for it to 
directly dictate adoption of a policy that, while reasonable, the vast majority of us would 
																																																						
97 A consensus liberal might counter that to say that a being is not a person is not to say that they may be 
treated in any way we like. It is merely to say that their treatment is not a constitutional essential or matter 
of basic justice. And since this means, on some Rawlsian views, that it is a question that can be resolved in 
accordance with non-public reason, withholding the status of person can be compatible, the interjection 
goes, with granting an individual stringent legal protections. Two points in response. First, this defence is 
obviously not available to those who think that public justifications must be offered for fundamental and 
non-fundamental political decisions alike. And second, even if the use of public reason is required only in 
tackling fundamental questions, the treatment of non-persons will still count as such a question insofar as 
the basic interests and rights of persons are simultaneously at stake. Yet it appears that this will frequently if 
not always be so. I take it, for instance, that insofar as organs are analogous to other scarce resources, it is a 
question of basic justice how we harvest and distribute them. By that token, however, when the exclusionary 
PCP is in place there will be no meaningful room to consider the ethical treatment of humans who have lost 
the moral powers outside the confines of public reason, even if it is assumed that public justifications must 
be produced only when fundamental questions are at issue. 
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consider the most repugnant of the options on offer.98 
If, on the foregoing grounds, consensus liberals cannot respond to the problem 
posed in this paper by altering the terms in which public justifications must be offered, 
their only alternative seems to be to bite the bullet, and accept that public policy on the 
determination of death should (absent a fortuitous balance of third-party-centred reasons) 
be determined randomly. The sustainability of the bullet-biting response depends, 
however, on how many other important political questions the Rawlsian model may fail to 
resolve satisfactorily. I have argued elsewhere that there are indeed other such questions, 
and I believe that there are yet more to be discovered. If so, it will become increasingly 
implausible to suggest that the sort of counter-intuitive consequences I have here 
described are a bearable cost to be priced in when adopting the consensus liberal view. 
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